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L. John Bird* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the state legislature of Delaware amended the Delaware 
General Corporate Law (the “DGCL”) to stipulate that a “bylaw adopted by 
the stockholders, prescribing the vote required for the election of directors, 
may not be amended or repealed by the board of directors.”1  The 
introduction of this language in the DGCL—language prohibiting a board 
from amending or repealing a stockholder created bylaw amendment—
breathed new life into an ongoing debate about whether the board of a 
company incorporated in Delaware has the legal power to amend or repeal 
other shareholder adopted bylaw amendments.2 
The debate hinges on two Sections of the DGCL that seem to create 
conflicting inferences.  According to Section 109 of the DGCL, a 
corporation can:   
 
confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon 
*J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2006, Foster Business 
School, University of Washington. 
 1. 1 DELAWARE LAWS GOVERNING BUSINESS ENTITIES:  ANNOTATED STATUTES AND 
RULES 21 (Spring 2007 ed.), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/csc/pdf/58559.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate, http:// 
www.theconglomerate.org/2006/07/delaware_bylaws.html (July 21, 2006) (a blog that 
includes comments of various contributors debating the ability of boards to amend or repeal 
shareholder adopted bylaw amendments within Delaware corporations, among other topics). 
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the directors . . . . The fact that such power has been so 
conferred upon the directors . . . shall not divest the 
stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws[.]3 
 
This statute provides the legal basis for a potential bylaw amendment 
struggle between the board (when given the power to amend bylaws 
through the articles of incorporation) and the shareholders (who retain 
power to amend the bylaws).4  Section 109 continues, “[t]he bylaws may 
contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or the certificate of 
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its 
affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.”5  This provides a basis to argue that 
shareholders should be able to amend the bylaws in any manner, provided 
they obtain a majority vote.  In contrast, the other side of this debate holds 
that a shareholder adopted bylaw amendment would impinge upon the 
board’s power to manage the dealings of the corporation as provided in 
Section 141 of the DGCL.6 
Because of a lack of case precedent and legislative action to reduce 
the confusion, the Delaware judiciary loses one of its most attractive 
attributes, predictability.7  In the words of Vice Chancellor Strine: 
 
Even if the stockholders could validly initiate and adopt a 
by-law limiting the authority of the directors, such a by-
law amendment would accomplish little or nothing if the 
board of directors could simply repeal it after the 
stockholders adopted it.  In some jurisdictions, of course, 
there is no question that such repeal can be prevented.  
Under many statutory schemes, the board of directors may 
not repeal a stockholder-adopted by-law if that by-law 
expressly prohibits such repeal.  In other jurisdictions, 
however, notably Delaware and New York, the corporation 
 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2008). 
 4. See id. 
 5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2008). 
 6. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield:  Can 
Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 
608 (1997) (“Not only does this provision seemingly make the board the ultimate repository 
of all corporate power and authority, but it can also be read to require that any deviation 
from this fundamental rule be expressed in the certificate of incorporation.”). 
 7. See Dosoung Choi et al., The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder 
Wealth, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 375 (1989) (stating that the predictability of the Delaware 
judiciary contributes to the high number of companies incorporating in Delaware). 
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statutes allow the board of directors to amend the by-laws 
if the certificate or articles of incorporation so provide and 
place no express limits on the application of such director 
amendment authority to stockholder-adopted by-laws.  The 
second significant legal uncertainty, therefore is whether, 
in the absence of an explicitly controlling statute, a 
stockholder-adopted by-law can be made immune from 
repeal or modification by the board of directors.8 
 
In order to provide maximum predictability and to encourage 
continued high rates of incorporation within Delaware, the legislature 
should adopt a rule with a predictive effect similar to that of the Model 
Business Corporation Act.  That Act provides explicit rules that could 
eliminate the ambiguity created by the DGCL.  Specifically, it states:  “A 
corporation's board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation's 
bylaws, unless . . . the shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a 
bylaw expressly provide that the board of directors may not amend, repeal, 
or reinstate that bylaw.”9  This type of rule (or one that makes it clear that 
the board can amend any bylaw regardless of shareholder wishes) would 
improve the predictability of judicial decision-making and would eliminate 
the time wasted in debating this topic.10  To maximize predictability and 
maintain its standing as the premier locale for incorporation, the Delaware 
legislature should amend the DGCL to make explicit its stance on a board’s 
power to amend or repeal shareholder adopted bylaw amendments. 
This Comment proceeds as follows:  Part II discusses corporate 
takeovers, one situation in which a board and its shareholders are likely to 
have differing incentives and desires with regard to the enactment of bylaw 
amendments, and which gives rise to a large number of the shareholder 
lawsuits and academic debates in this area.  Part III outlines the current 
debate about whether a board of directors has the legal power to amend or 
repeal a shareholder adopted bylaw amendment.  It also briefly describes 
the arguments forwarded in support of each side of this debate.  Part IV 
 8. Gen. DataComm Indus. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (emphasis added). 
 9. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b)(2) (2004). 
 10. There are far too many participants in the controversy to list.  Moreover, there is a 
rich amount of literature on the topic.  See Coffee, Jr., supra note 6, at 606 (discussing the 
theoretical implications of the effect of shareholder initiatives on corporate governance); 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:  
Taking Back the Street? 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 409 (1998) (introducing arguments on both 
sides of the shareholder bylaw amendments controversy); Posting of Larry Ribstein to 
Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/06/lucian_bebchuk_.html/ (June 16, 
2006, 07:04) (discussing a shareholder activist suit over a proposed amendment to the bylaw 
of a publicly traded corporation). 
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addresses the aforementioned passage of the Model Business Corporation 
Act11 and the results reached in various states that have modeled the 
relevant Sections of their corporate laws after it.12  Finally, Part V discusses 
why the Model Business Corporation Act is an appropriate model for 
Delaware to adopt and would require only minor changes to provide 
maximum predictability and eliminate a fundamental concern corporations 
may have when deciding whether to incorporate in Delaware. 
II. TAKEOVERS AND POISON PILLS 
The case law that discusses shareholder and board conflict about 
bylaw amendments is primarily centered on takeover attempts13—a 
situation in which shareholders and the board are likely to have divergent 
incentives.  While shareholders will want to maximize the value of their 
investment, the board of directors is likely to be displaced following a 
takeover, creating an incentive for them to prevent the takeover from 
occurring in order to keep their directorship.14 
One of the more common methods used to prevent a takeover is the 
creation of a poison pill.15  It is important to note, however, that poison 
pills do not function only to prevent takeovers, but can arguably result in 
creating increased shareholder value16 or, conversely, in reducing it.17  One 
case in which a poison pill would create value for shareholders is when the 
board has recently finished a study on the company and its future earnings 
that leads it to believe that the firm is undervalued by 50%.  If an outside 
 11. § 10.20(b)(2)(2004). 
 12. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 2008) (“Bylaws may be adopted, amended 
or repealed either by approval of the outstanding shares (Section 152) or by the approval of 
the board, except as provided in Section 212.  Subject to subdivision (a)(5) of Section 204, 
the articles or bylaws may restrict or eliminate the power of the board to adopt, amend or 
repeal any or all bylaws.”). 
 13. See, e.g., infra note 15. 
 14. This inference is based on the statement that firm managers have taken “various 
kinds of actions . . . to prevent their removal by shareholder vote or shareholder consent.”  
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 178 (9th ed. 2005). 
 15. See generally Henry Lesser & Douglas Sugimoto, Shareholder By-Law 
Amendments:  The Looming Battle, M&A LAW., Jan. 1998, at 2 (describing developments 
regarding shareholder by-law amendments and anti-takeover defenses). 
 16. See William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for 
Corporate Control:  An Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 399 (1988) (discussing 
a study on the wealth effects of poison pills, which found that poison pills can sometimes 
result in substantial positive outcomes for shareholders).   
 17. See generally Office of the Chief Economist, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, A Study on 
the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) P 
83,971 (Mar. 5, 1988) (stating that adoption of poison pills has a negative effect on 
shareholder wealth). 
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party were to initiate a takeover, the party may offer a premium over the 
current value of the stock of 30%.  From the shareholder perspective, 
accepting such an offer would seem to be a good decision, but, in reality, 
the shareholders would be foregoing additional earnings of 20% of the 
stock price.  By delaying the takeover through use of a poison pill, the 
board may be able to convince the market to revalue the stock at what the 
board feels is the correct price, thus improving each shareholder’s position 
beyond that offered by the potential acquirer.  This positive aspect of 
poison pills is an important argument that boards may use in litigation, as it 
removes the presumption that the poison pill exists only as an entrenchment 
device that could create liability for the directors under Blasius Industries, 
Inc. v. Atlas Corp.18 
The issues surrounding the implementation of poison pills and 
whether or not shareholders can amend the bylaws dealing with them were 
addressed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming Companies.19  As 
stated by that Court, “Oklahoma and Delaware have substantially similar 
corporation acts,”20 and “a review of Delaware decisions revealed no 
comparable case from that state [Delaware].”21  In Teamsters, shareholders 
were found to have the power to amend the bylaws of a corporation 
because of an Oklahoma statute largely identical to Section 109(a) of the 
DGCL.22  While not the first case to hold that shareholders have the right to 
adopt bylaw amendments independent of the board,23 the Teamsters’ 
18.  564 A.2d 651, 657 (Del. Ch. 1988).  In Blasius, the Court of Chancery held that an 
action taken as a “selfishly motivated effort to protect the incumbent board” would violate 
the board’s duty of loyalty.  The enhanced business judgment rule found in Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) is applied by the court in cases where 
the board takes defensive actions against takeover attempts. 
 19. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, Inc, 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 
1999). 
 20. Id. at 910. 
 21. Id.  It is also important to note that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is looking to 
Delaware law to see how to proceed in this Oklahoma corporate case, and additionally 
addresses the lack of precedent in Delaware law.  As noted in Part I of this comment, the 
predictability of Delaware law is important and leaving this issue open negatively affects the 
Delaware judiciary’s reputation. 
 22. Compare 18 O.S. 1991 § 1013(A) (providing that, “after a corporation has received 
any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
shareholders entitled to vote . . . provided, however, any corporation, in its certificate of 
incorporation, may confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.”) 
(current version at 18 O.S. 2008 § 1013(A)(2008)) with 8 Del. C. § 109(a).  Section 109(a) 
provides that, after a corporation has received payment for stock, “the power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote . . .”  While a 
corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer this power on the board of 
directors, doing so “shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit 
their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.” 
 23. For just one example of a prior case in which stockholders sued to force a 
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success and the similarity of Delaware law to Oklahoma law made this case 
persuasive authority for subsequent Delaware cases.24 
In a recent case,25 Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, the owner of 140 
shares of CA, Inc. common stock, successfully sued to force CA, Inc. to 
withdraw its plan to exclude his poison pill proposal from the corporate 
ballot.26  Although Professor Bebchuk’s proposed bylaw amendment was 
not in response to an existing takeover attempt, it was drafted without an 
expiration date in anticipation of future takeover attempts.27  This case was 
one of the first Delaware cases to effectively force a corporation to include 
a shareholder’s bylaw amendment on the corporate ballot since, 
historically, the SEC has allowed companies to exclude this type of 
proposal from the ballot.28  In 2006, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) responded to CA, Inc.’s request for a guarantee from 
the SEC that there would be no federal prosecution should CA, Inc.’s board 
refuse to include Professor Bebchuk’s proposal on their ballot.  
Unfortunately for CA, Inc., the SEC’s letter expressed “no view with 
respect to CA’s intention to omit the instant proposal from the proxy 
materials relating to its next annual meeting of security holders.”29 
III. THE BOARD’S POWER TO AMEND OR REPEAL SHAREHOLDER 
ADOPTED BYLAW AMENDMENTS 
To again quote Vice Chancellor Strine, “[In Delaware] . . . the 
corporation statutes allow the board of directors to amend the by-laws if the 
certificate or articles of incorporation so provide and place no express 
limits on the application of such director amendment authority to 
stockholder-adopted by-laws.”30  Although this portion of the opinion is 
corporation to include a shareholder bylaw amendment proposal on the ballot, see Exxon 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281 (Feb. 28, 1992). 
 24. See, e.g., Gen. DataComm Indus v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 821, 822 n.2 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (noting the similarity between Oklahoma law and Delaware law).  Notice 
also that in comparison to the number of corporations formed in Oklahoma and the number 
of cases litigated in Delaware, Oklahoma, through Teamsters, has become 
disproportionately influential in the litigation of shareholder activist suits. 
 25. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 903 A.2d 737 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 26. Bebchuk vs. CA Enables Shareholder Voting on Poison Pill Hylaws, HLS NEWS, 
July 5, 2006, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/07/ 
05_bebchuk.php 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, 
and Poison Pills, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-06 (January 28, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=659322 (providing additional information as to the 
precise mechanics of denying shareholders the ability to garner enough shareholder support 
to pass bylaw amendments). 
 29. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
 30. Gen. DataComm Indus. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2 (Del. Ch. 
  
2008] STOCKHOLDER AND BOARD BYLAW BATTLES 223 
 
 
dicta, it explicitly removes the ability of potential litigants to predict how 
the Chancery Court would decide a case where the issue is whether a board 
action to amend a shareholder-approved bylaw amendment was valid.  
According to Vice Chancellor Strine, the court will decide such cases as 
they arise, on a case-by-case basis, which will leave litigants guessing as to 
what litigation results they can expect.  Although Vice Chancellor Strine 
made this remark in 1999, my research did not indicate that any other 
Delaware Court of Chancery opinions offer further clarity on how the 
Court might decide this issue.  Further, although it offers no predictive 
value as to how the court might adjudicate this issue, in 2006, a Section of 
the DGCL was amended to add language resolving this issue in one 
situation.31  That added language reads, “A bylaw amendment adopted by 
stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the 
election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board 
of directors.”32  The plain reading of this change affects only Section 216, 
and in the synopsis of this amendment, Senator Vaughn notes that “[t]his 
amendment does not address any other situation in which the board of 
directors amends a bylaw adopted by stockholder vote.”33  Yet, a negative 
implication is created by including this rule in only this Section of the 
DGCL. 
Prior to this latest amendment, it was easy to see both sides of the 
debate about whether or not a board could, without legal sanction, amend a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw amendment.  This conflict had hinged on a 
disparity between Sections 109(a) and (b) and Section 141(a) of the DGCL.  
Because the newly adopted statutory language addresses the issue of 
shareholder adopted bylaw amendments explicitly, the negative implication 
would presumably address other bylaw amendments with equal authority.  
Professor Gordon Smith makes the point that regardless of where a person 
may have stood on this issue prior to the amendment of Section 216, it is 
difficult to see any way in which the newly created negative implication 
would help support the argument that the board cannot further amend a 
shareholder bylaw amendment.34 
Further, according to Vice Chancellor Strine, “[t]he second significant 
legal uncertainty, therefore is whether, in the absence of an explicitly 
controlling statute, a stockholder-adopted by-law can be made immune 
from repeal or modification by the board of directors.”35  It can be inferred 
1999). 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2008). 
 32. S. 322, 143rd Gen. Assembly (Del. 2006) available at 
http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis143.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+322/$file/legis.html?open. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Smith, supra note 2. 
 35. Gen. DataComm Indus., 731 A.2d at 818, n.2. 
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at Section 141 
continues past the quotation just given.  Section 141 reads: 
 
 
from Vice Chancellor Strine’s comment that in this debate there is no 
explicitly controlling statute in the DGCL, nor any controlling precedent. 
To explicate the shareholder activist argument in this debate, the 
DGCL Section 109 provides that shareholders do not forego their right to 
adopt bylaw amendments even if that right is concurrently vested in the 
board.36  As Section 109 explains, “[t]he bylaws may contain any 
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of 
incorporation.”37  Because the DGCL leaves the ability to adopt bylaw 
amendments to the shareholders,38 and this Section39 of the Delaware code 
provides that “bylaws may contain any provision . . . relating to the 
business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or 
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers, or 
employees,”40 it would seem that a bylaw amendment including a provision 
preventing the board from further amending or revoking the shareholder 
adopted amendment would be valid.  Nevertheless, the SEC has continually 
issued no-action letters based on the interpretation of the DGCL that is 
shared by many Delaware law firms,41 as is explained below in the 
discussion of DGCL Section 141.  The issuance of no-action letters had the 
effect of eliminating the ability of shareholders to get their proposed 
amendments on the ballot at a company’s annual shareholder meeting—a 
necessary step in garnering sufficient shareholder votes to pass a bylaw 
amendment.  SEC no-action letters thus sidestep the issue of a potential 
conflict of a board’s power to amend shareholder adopted bylaw 
amendments by making it nearly impossible to garner the vote necessary to 
pass a shareholder bylaw amendment.  Yet, at least one shareholder 
activist, Lucian A. Bebchuk, has recently been able to avoid having the 
SEC issue a no-action letter for his proposed bylaw amendment,42 making 
it a priority to resolve the question of who would win in a bylaw battle 
in a Delaware corporation. 
Section 141 of the DGCL requires that “[t]he business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors.”43  The pro-board side in this 
debate argues that a bylaw amendment would in effect be a form of 
managing the corporation, thus making shareholder-adopted bylaw 
amendments invalid.  It is important to note, however, th
 36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a)-(b) (2008). 
 37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2008). 
 39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2008). 
 40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2008). 
 41. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1999). 
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as shall be provided in the 
ertificate of incorporation.44 
r to amend or revoke shareholder bylaw 
amen
uld refer to Section 141(a), so 
that 
 
 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.  If any such provision is made in the 
certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties 
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this 
chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and 
by such person or persons 
c
 
Thus, while the board has presumptive authority to manage the 
business of a corporation, the DGCL and a company’s certificate of 
incorporation act as the deciding factors in determining when shareholders 
can act in a manner that would seem at first blush to impinge upon the 
management function of the board.  Since the majority of Delaware 
corporations follow the standards outlined in the DGCL45 without 
extensive amendment, the power to amend the bylaws is almost invariably 
given to the board of directors.  As there are typically no limits placed on 
the board’s power by a company’s articles of incorporation or the DGCL, 
the reference to articles of incorporation and “this chapter”46 in Section 141 
of the DGCL are essentially irrelevant to this issue.  Thus, a typical board 
appears to have the powe
dments with impunity. 
The arguments as to whether a board has the power to amend 
shareholder-adopted bylaws is further clouded by the conflict between 
Sections 109(b) and 141(a) of the DGCL, a conflict which has been the 
subject of discussion for a number of years.  In 1997, Professor Jeffrey 
Gordon authored a paper which gained notoriety labeling the conflict 
between these two Sections a “recursive loop.”47  The “loop” works as 
follows:  the phrase “except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter” 
in Section 141(a) could be interpreted as referring to Section 109(b), so that 
Section 109(b) trumps Section 141(a).  In the alternative, the phrase “not 
inconsistent with law” in Section 109(b) co
Section 141(a) trumps Section 109(b). 
The determination as to which Section is dominant, 141(a) or 109(b), 
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109(a) (1999). 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1999). 
 47. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:  An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 
(1997). 
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powe
nged even if Section 141 
was 
 
 
merely adds to the confusion surrounding the ability of the board to amend 
or revoke shareholder-adopted bylaw amendments.  Board members would 
argue that if 141(a) was dominant, their ability to further change 
shareholder-adopted bylaws would be part of corporate management by the 
board, and thus within their power.  Board members would further argue 
that, even if 109(a) was deemed the dominant Section of law, they are not 
actually eliminating shareholders’ ability to adopt bylaw amendments 
pursuant to 109(a); they are merely exercising their own rights under 
109(a) and, providing even greater credence to the board’s position, their
r as defined by the corporation’s articles of incorporation.48   
Shareholders would argue that if 109(a) is dominant, they should have 
the power to adopt bylaws that are explicitly protected from further board 
amendment or revision.49  Shareholder activists would also argue that 
bylaw amendments such as those that limit the use of a poison pill do not 
impinge upon the board’s role and direction to manage the business and 
affairs of the company in violation of statute, as the certificate of 
incorporation allows for shareholders to enact such bylaw amendments.50  
The shareholders’ argument would remain uncha
deemed the dominant Section of the DGCL. 
This ongoing debate regarding which DGCL Section is dominant—
141(a) or 109(b)—and who, then, has the ultimate power to amend bylaws, 
was brought to life once more by the change to Section 216 of the DGCL.  
Despite the notes accompanying that change (which state that the change 
has no effect on any other Section of the DGCL),51 it creates the strong 
negative implication that only bylaw amendments specifically referred to in 
Section 216 are protected from subsequent board revision or repeal.  
Therefore, Section 216 appears to support the argument that Section 141(a) 
dominates Section 109(b) and that, statutorily speaking, corporate 
 48. Presuming, of course, the particular corporation includes in its certificate of 
incorporation the power for directors to amend the bylaws.  See Frederick H. Alexander, 
Esq. & James D. Honaker, Esq., The Nuts and Bolts of Majority Voting, in 1 39TH ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 585, 590 (Practising Law Institute 2007) (“Nearly all 
Delaware corporations include in their charter a provision empowering directors to amend 
the bylaws, and such provisions typically grant the board unqualified amendment power.”). 
 49. An example of such explicit language might read, “This bylaw shall not be subject 
to further amendment, alteration, or repeal by the board of directors, but shall only be 
amended, altered, or repealed by the vote of a majority of shareholders to effect such 
amendment, alteration, or repeal.” 
 50. My research did not indicate that any Delaware corporations include in their articles 
of incorporation a clause eliminating shareholders’ right to enact bylaw amendments as 
provided in the DGCL § 109(a). 
 51. S. 322, 143rd Gen. Assem. (Del. 2006), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/ 
LIS/lis143.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+322/$file/legis.html?open (“This amendment does not 
address any other situation in which the board of directors amends a bylaw adopted by 
stockholder vote.”). 
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en more emphasis than a shareholder’s 
right to amend corporate bylaws. 
IV. T ORPORATION ACT AND SHAREHOLDER 
BYLAW AMENDMENTS 
statutes similar to Section 10.20 of the Model 
Busi
to pass bylaw amendments.56  My research of case law from states that 
 
management by the board is giv
HE MODEL BUSINESS C
California, a state that follows the general format of the Model 
Business Corporation Act in the area of shareholder bylaw amendments, 
provides a marked contrast to Delaware which does not follow the Model 
Business Corporation Act.  For example, in contrast to Delaware’s 
statutes52 California’s bylaw amendment statutes are relatively clear.  The 
relevant Section of California law states, “Bylaws may be adopted, 
amended or repealed either by approval of the outstanding shares (Section 
152) or by the approval of the board . . . .  [T]he articles or bylaws may 
restrict or eliminate the power of the board to adopt, amend or repeal any or 
all bylaws.”53  The California corporate code allows for shareholders to 
amend the corporate bylaws with no uncertainty and includes in the 
amendment a provision restricting or eliminating the board’s ability to 
further amend or revoke a shareholder amendment.  As a search of the 
Fletcher Cyclopedia54 reveals, at least nineteen states have adopted 
corporate bylaw amendment 
ness Corporation Act.55 
The predictive quality created by the Model Business Corporation Act 
is apparent when analyzing the case law arising from shareholder attempts 
 
 52. See supra Part III.  
 53. CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 2008). 
 54. 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 4183 (perm. Ed., rev. vol. 1982).  The following subsections contain the 
provisions of the states which, during a cursory review, contain language nearly identical to 
that of the Model Business Corporation Act:  4183-17, 4183-22, 4183-50, 4183-57, 4183-
82, 4183-92, 4183-111, 4183-127, 4183-137, 4183-142, 4183-152, 4183-172, 4183-192, 
elevant portion of the Model Business Corporation Act §10.20 reads as 
follows: 
f directors may amend or repeal the 
 reserve that power 
t the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or 
4183-207, 4183-217, 4183-237, 4183-242, 4183-257, and 4183-262. 
 55. The r
(b) A corporation’s board o
corporation’s bylaws, unless: 
(1) the articles of incorporation or section 10.21
exclusively to the shareholders in whole or part; or 
(2) the shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw 
expressly provide tha
reinstate that bylaw. 
 56. In a search in “search” on the website Westlaw.com, within the “allstates” database, 
and using the search string “bylaw /3 amend! & pill” only twenty-one results were found as 
of February 24, 2008.  Nineteen of the results were Delaware cases, one was a case 
completely unrelated to take-over defenses, and the final was a case originating in 
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followed the Model Business Corporation Act in drafting their bylaw 
amendment provisions revealed no cases arising from shareholders’ 
attempts to prevent board revision of shareholder-created bylaw 
amendments.57  This is not to say that such cases will never arise in those 
states, but rather that these cases have not arisen yet.  It is reasonable to 
infer that the clarity of the corporate statute at issue would compel potential 
litigants to settle or drop a case that they would otherwise litigate if the 
corporation were formed in Delaware or another jurisdiction with corporate 
laws similar to those of Delaware. 
Litigation is expensive and uncertain, and becoming more expensive 
every year.58  As it is likely that corporations will continue to favor legal 
regimes which minimize litigation by having clear laws and a high level of 
predictability,59 it is becoming increasingly important that the Delaware 
legislature resolve this issue proactively, rather than reactively, to avoid 
damaging its reputation as the premier state for incorporation. 
 
V. THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT:  A MODEL FOR 
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW. 
 
Various parts of the Model Business Corporation Act,60 written by the 
American Bar Association, have been integrated into the statutes of a 
number of states.  Some states, such as Virginia,61 have taken the language 
of the Model Business Corporation Act and incorporated it into their 
statutes without change.  In other states, it serves as the basis for the 
legislature to draft its own statutes.62  This has resulted in a number of very 
Oklahoma, which had corporate statutes similar to Delaware, and not the Model Business 
Corporation Act.  This case is Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, 
Inc., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999).  This search string is by no means exhaustive, but serves to 
RIZ. 
 to Rise, LAW.COM, Dec. 12, 2005, 
d since, 
.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf (last visited Dec. 
illustrate the lack of cases on point in jurisdictions outside of Delaware. 
 57. These states include Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-714 (2005); Mississippi, MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 79-4-10.20 (West 1972); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 490.1020 (2002); Arizona, A
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1020 (1996), Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1020 (1987). 
 58. Lindsay Fortado, Hourly Billing Rates Continue
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1134122711101. 
 59. See, e.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE:  SOUND DEVELOPMENT 
MANAGEMENT (1995), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/govpolicy.pdf. 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2008) (“The importance of predictability cannot be overstate
without it, the orderly existence of citizens and institutions would be impossible.”). 
 60. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Model Business Corporation Act (2002) 
http://www
12, 2008). 
 61. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-714 (2005). 
 62. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 156B, § 17 (LexisNexis 2008) (“The power to 
make, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders; provided that if authorized by 
the articles of organization, the by-laws may provide that the directors may also make, 
amend or repeal the by-laws in whole or in part, except with respect to any provision thereof 
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similar statutes across a large number of states.  Delaware is one state that 
has yet to adopt bylaw amendment laws modeled after the Model Business 
Corporation Act.  While this is not necessarily bad, the uncertainty created 
by the current statutory language63 and lack of precedent64 resolving this 
confusion is undesirable.  Should it wish to resolve this uncertainty, the 
Delaware legislature has several options.  While the five options presented 
below are by no means an exhaustive list, a range of options from 
extremely pro-board to extremely pro-shareholder is presented.  The first 
option is to do nothing and wait for a case involving shareholder-adopted 
bylaw amendments to reach the judiciary.  Second, the legislature could 
amend existing statutes to give the board explicit power to amend or revoke 
shareholder adopted bylaw amendments.  Third, it could adopt the relevant 
provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act wholesale, giving 
shareholders the ability to adopt bylaws that cannot be further amended by 
the board when so stated within the bylaw.  Fourth, it could make all 
shareholder-adopted bylaws immune to board modification as a default, 
allowing the certificate of incorporation to create exceptions on a 
corporation-by-corporation basis.  Fifth, the legislature could adopt 
legislation allowing shareholders to create bylaws that disallow further 
board amendment for a limited period of time.  Each of these five options 
has associated costs and benefits.  Given Delaware’s current corporate 
landscape, the fifth option appears to be the best. 
A. Wait for a case to reach the court. 
Of the five options presented above, waiting for a case to reach the 
judiciary shows the least amount of initiative and is the most irresponsible.  
As the premier state for large company incorporation,65 Delaware cannot 
allow unpredictability to enter its judicial landscape.66  Currently, even the 
which by law, the articles of organization or the by-laws requires action by the stockholders. 
Not later than the time of giving notice of the meeting of stockholders next following the 
making, amending or repealing by the directors of any bylaw, notice thereof stating the 
substance of such change shall be given to all stockholders entitled to vote on amending the 
bylaws.  Any by-law adopted by the directors may be amended or repealed by the 
ee supra Part III for the discussion of why the current statutory language is 
n
. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 975 P.2d at 910; see also supra note 20 and accompanying 
x
cly-
DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 59, at 20-21 (describing the importance 
stockholders.”). 
 63. S
u clear. 
 64
te t. 
 65. See State of Delaware Official Website, Division of Corporations, 
http://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (“[M]ore than 50% of all U.S. publi
traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500 [have their legal home in Delaware][.]”). 
 66. See ASIAN 
of predictability). 
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 for the current lack of clarity 
and the accompanying judicial uncertainty. 
B.  to amend or revoke shareholder 
adopted bylaw amendments. 
within the state).  Yet in this era of increased shareholder activism,71 and 
 
esteemed Court of Chancery67 cannot predict how it would decide a case in 
which a shareholder sues after passing a bylaw amendment that was 
immediately amended or revoked by the board.68  While this course of 
action appears to be the one the Delaware Legislature is pursuing, it creates 
the lowest level of predictability,69 and is thus undesirable.  While avoiding 
making a change is a way of avoiding personal responsibility for any 
change that is eventually enacted and may be politically expedient, it also 
makes the Delaware Legislature responsible
Give the board explicit power
As the most management-friendly of the five options this Comment 
presents, giving the board explicit power to amend or revoke shareholder-
adopted bylaw amendments seems to be an excellent fit for Delaware70 (or 
any state trying to encourage a company to incorporate or reincorporate 
 
 67. See Press Release, LexisNexis, Delaware Courts Lead Nation in Use of Electronic 
Filing with Major Expansion of LexisNexis File and Reserve (Jan. 8, 2008), available at 
 68. S h. 
1999).  In 
ction as to its liability in this option.  Any of the 
 
tions of increased institutional 
EHOLDER ACTIVISM, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/about/releases/1029.asp (“The Delaware Court of Chancery, [is] 
the nation’s premier business court . . . .”). 
ee Gen. DataComm Indus. v. Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2 (Del. C
General Datacomm, Vice Chancellor Strine wrote: 
Under many statutory schemes, the board of directors may not repeal a 
stockholder-adopted by-law if that by-law expressly prohibits such 
repeal.  In other jurisdictions, however, notably Delaware and New 
York, the corporation statutes allow the board of directors to amend the 
by-laws if the certificate or articles of incorporation so provide and 
place no express limits on the application of such director amendment 
authority to stockholder-adopted by-laws.  The second significant legal 
uncertainty, therefore is whether, in the absence of an explicitly 
controlling statute, a stockholder-adopted by-law can be made immune 
from repeal or modification by the board of directors. (emphasis added). 
 69. As a company would not know whether they had any liability until after the 
shareholder suit, it could make no predi
other options provide some level of guidance as to the legality of board action amending a 
shareholder adopted bylaw amendment. 
 70. See Crystal R. Reid, Corporate Landscape Changing, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, May 6,
2007, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2007/05/06/news/local/ 
132998.txt (“[Delaware] always has been most responsive to corporate managment [sic].”). 
 71. See Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 
(1990) (discussing shareholder monitoring); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Verses Control:  
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) 
(discussing the emergence of institutional investors as corporate monitors); Edward B. 
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 
GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991) (examining the agency implica
shareholder activism); ASHTON PARTNERS, THE NEW CRISIS:  SHAR
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with investment companies controlling large blocks of votes,72 a law that is 
this unfavorable to shareholders may have a negative impact on Delaware.  
If this type of law was passed, “Delaware corporation shareholders may 
start pressing managment [sic] for [a corporate structure more friendly to 
shareholders].”73  If an investment fund were to threaten a company with a 
proxy fight, the company’s managers and board of directors would have a 
strong incentive74 to acquiesce on the issue, even if that required the 
company to reincorporate outside of Delaware in order to appease the 
major shareholder. 
Although it is unlikely that this change alone would prompt a 
company’s shareholders to push for reincorporation as a part of the overall 
corporate structure,75 it could be the proverbial straw that breaks the 
camel’s back and could result in a number of companies leaving Delaware 
to reincorporate in a state with corporate laws that are more shareholder-
friendly.76 
C. Adopt the relevant provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act. 
Adopting the substance of the provisions of the Model Business 
Corporation Act is a route taken by many states in formulating their 
corporate codes.77  The Act is continuously amended by the American Bar 
Association, and therefore is extremely up-to-date.78  It has incorporated 
available at http://www.fdashtonpartners.com/media/PDFs/ 
trends/The%20New%20Crisis%20-%20Shareholder%20Activism.pdf. 
 72. See ASHTON PARTNERS, supra note 71, at 2 (“[H]edge funds could have far-reaching 
ON PARTNERS, supra note 71, at 1 (“[A]pproximately 80% of companies 
s
as placed itself in a potentially 
ith very shareholder-friendly 
in large 
m=Product.AddToCart&pid=5070548 (last visited Dec. 12, 
2008) ESS 
CORP
ompletely revised Act in 1984.  Significant amendments to the Model 
impacts on Corporate America with an estimated $1 trillion in assets.”). 
 73. Reid, supra note 70. 
 74. See ASHT
re earched were either acquired or run by new management within three years after the 
proxy contest.”). 
 75. See Reid, supra note 70 (“North Dakota h
competitive stance to Delaware, offering a corporate structure that Delaware corporation 
shareholders may start pressing managment [sic] for.”). 
 76. North Dakota is a perfect example of a state w
corporate codes.  It has adopted the most pro-shareholder corporate statutes in the U.S. in an 
effort to attract more companies to incorporate within it.  Id. 
 77. See, e.g., supra note 57 (containing a list of some states that have adopted 
part the relevant Sections of the Model Business Corporation Act). 
 78. See American Bar Association Web Store, http://www.abanet.org/abastore/ 
index.cfm?section=main&f
.  This store lists the following in the product description for MODEL BUSIN
ORATION ACT 2007:  
The Model Act was first promulgated in 1950 by the Committee on Corporate 
Laws of the American Bar Associations Section of Business Law.  The 
Committee has regularly reviewed and revised the Act since that time, including 
a major revision in 1969, substantial changes to the financial provisions in 1980 
and a c
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many changes over the years based on best practices, as well as the 
suggestions of practitioners and academics.79 
While certain to provide predictability when confronted with the issue 
of boards amending shareholder-passed bylaw provisions,80 adopting the 
relevant provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act would be a 
fairly significant step backwards from Delaware’s historically pro-
management81 statutes.  This change would also allow corporate raiders to 
get a foot in the door.82  Although other states have statutes of this type,83 
no state can compare to Delaware in terms of the sheer volume of 
companies incorporated within it.84  Thus, while adopting the Model 
Business Corporation Act serves the purposes of most states,85 it may 
ultimately prove unsuccessful in Delaware if corporate boards fear 
shareholder activists86 enough to reincorporate in different states.87 
D. Make shareholder adopted bylaws immune to board modification as a 
default rule. 
Making shareholder-adopted bylaws immune to board modifications 
as a default rule would be more shareholder-friendly than the existing law 
in most states.88  The arguments noted above against adopting provisions 
similar to the Model Business Corporation Act would apply with equal 
weight to making shareholder amendments per se immune to further board 
amendment.  Additionally, the strength of this law would even more 
actively drive out corporations that wish to avoid giving activist 
 
Act published in supplements regularly thereafter, including, most recently, 
2005. 
 79. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards From the 
Model Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201 (1999), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=163572 (providing one example of input and feedback about the 
formulation of the Model Business Corporation Act). 
 80. See generally discussion supra Part IV (arguing that the Model Business 
Corporation Act provides predictability to the extent that suits are rarely brought for 
adjudication). 
 81. Reid, supra note 70. 
 82. Id. (describing a pro-shareholder statutory change that could “open[] up the state for 
corporate raiders”). 
 83. See supra note 57 (listing a few examples of such states). 
 84. See State of Delaware Official Website, Division of Corporations, supra note 65. 
 85. That the law serves the purposes of most states is evidenced by the number of states 
that have statutes based on the Model Business Corporation Act. 
 86. See generally ASHTON PARTNERS, supra note 71 (explaining the fears a board might 
have when dealing with activist shareholders). 
 87. To gain an idea of how competitive states are in trying to persuade corporations to 
incorporate within their jurisdiction, see infra notes 112-13. 
 88. Because boards are generally given the power to amend corporate bylaws, a default 
rule making a bylaw immune to board amendment would be taking away that power. 
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were not 
allowed to opt-out, this sort of law would cripple a board of directors, and 
E. Allow shareholders to create bylaws that disallow further board 
uestion of what would happen with other 
byla
 
 
shareholders a strong ability to coerce or limit board action. 
In the same way the DGCL allows companies to give the board the 
power to amend bylaws,89 one possible method of mitigating the 
consequences of this sort of law would be to statutorily allow companies to 
opt-out through their articles of incorporation.  In the same manner that 
companies can give the bylaw amendment power to the board (and most 
Delaware corporations do), creating a law such as this and allowing for a 
company to opt out in their articles of incorporation would likely result in 
every company opting-out, making the law ineffectual in solving the 
problem that it was meant to address.  In essence, if companies 
if companies were allowed to opt out, the law would be impotent. 
amendment for a limited duration. 
In order to craft a bylaw amendment statute that is balanced between 
appeasing shareholders90 and leaving corporate decision making power in 
the hands of the board,91 the Delaware legislature is forced to walk a fine 
line.  Given the speed at which businesses and shareholders are maturing,92 
an approach that creates a clear legal distinction without appearing to be 
overly pro-shareholder or pro-management would be ideal.93  A statute that 
creates a limited ability for shareholders to protect specific bylaws would 
seem to strike this chord.  While it appears that the Delaware legislature 
has taken a step towards this solution with the newly adopted amendment 
to the DGCL Section 216,94 the q
w amendments conflicts remains, along with the accompanying 
uncertainty and unpredictability. 
 89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) provides corporations with this option. 
 90. See Reid, supra note 70 (arguing that shareholders may start pressing management 
to incorporate in states with pro-shareholder legal regimes, making the appeasement of 
shareholders a necessary consideration in order to maintain the high level of incorporations 
that Delaware now enjoys). 
 91. That this is necessary is shown by the concern boards give to choosing a state for 
reincorporation.  Their decision is based on such concerns as corporate raiders, as 
mentioned in note 82 herein, as well as a number of other aspects of a state’s legal system, 
as illustrated in notes 110, 112, and 113 herein. 
 92. See, e.g., ASHTON PARTNERS, supra note 71, at 2 (quoting Carl Icahn as saying 
“[t]he environment for shareholder activism continues to improve”). 
 93. All statements as to what is “good” or “ideal” are based purely on the goal of 
maintaining high levels of incorporation within Delaware, along with the consequential high 
levels of tax income and legal prestige. 
 94. See supra Part III herein.  Section 216 deals with a specific area susceptible to 
board members entrenchment attempts, and based on how recently the amendment was 
implemented, appears to have finally ripened in the eyes of the Delaware legislature. 
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 tailored ability to amend would also ensure that 
prev
be inclined to impose fiduciary limitations on bylaws at the front end, 
 
 
This uncertainty can only be resolved through a broad statute that 
deals directly with the issue.  Anything less would leave unanswered 
questions and unresolved potential conflicts.  The statute would need to 
grant specific authority for shareholders to adopt bylaws that could, if 
specified, be protected from board revocation or amendment for a period of 
2 years.95  This limited protection from board amendment would serve the 
purpose of shareholder activists in affecting such major corporate events as 
takeover attempts,96 without affecting the board’s ability to run the 
corporation (as well as avoiding a violation of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 
141).97  Since shareholders typically meet annually,98 the minimum length 
of time that could reasonably be considered for a moratorium on the 
board’s ability to affect a change would be one year.  If a company has 
shareholder meetings less than once a year, the span of time between 
shareholder meetings should be the minimum moratorium on board 
amendment of bylaws which prohibit further board amendment.  This 
would ensure that shareholders are able to exercise their statutory right to 
amend the corporate bylaws99 and that the right is not just lip-service 
followed by an immediate board action to reverse the shareholder 
change.100  This narrowly
ious stockholders did not have an undue influence on the operations of 
the corporation. 
As illustrated by Professor Bebchuk,101 a shareholder adopted bylaw 
can, if narrowly tailored, pass through the initial stages of judicial 
review.102  As argued by Professor Gordon Smith, “Delaware courts would 
 95. This is merely one example of the potential time limits that could be written into the 
statute.  One year, or three year limits would be equally plausible.  The Legislature should, 
however, think of a rational justification for the period of time they choose. 
 96. Specifically, shareholders could change the nature of poison pills or force their 
redemption, a concern of shareholders as evidenced in part two of this note. 
 97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2008) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”). 
 98. This is by no means the rule, as each company’s bylaws specify the frequency of its 
shareholder meetings.  If, however, a company’s management has refused to convene a 
shareholder meeting for an excessive length of time, the Chancery Court can require one be 
convened.  See, for example, Saxon Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 
1984), where management refused to hold a shareholder meeting for a period of time 
exceeding 13 months, or within 30 days of the date designated in the company’s bylaws or 
articles of incorporation, and was forced to hold a shareholder meeting. 
 99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109(a) (2008). 
 100. According to Vice Chancellor Strine, the current legal regime of Delaware may 
allow just such an action as this, without legal repercussion for the board.  General 
DataComm, 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2. 
 101. Bebchuk, 902 A.2d 737 (2006). 
 102. Id. 
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orate change without stripping the board of its decision making 
autho
 activist shareholders as well as 
corporate managers and board members. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
rather than forcing the board of directors to amend the offensive bylaws 
after the fact.”103  This continued narrow allowance of shareholder bylaw 
amendments, combined with the ability to make amendments with limited 
duration would, unlike earlier shareholder actions,104 allow shareholders to 
affect corp
rity. 
As institutional shareholders have grown in size and influence,105 the 
importance of maintaining a statutory system that appeals to them has also 
increased.106  Yet, Delaware did not become the premier state for 
corporations through appeasing shareholders, but through management-
friendly policies.107  As has been repeated many times in this comment, 
maintaining the high level of incorporations Delaware currently enjoys 
depends upon satisfying institutional and
As large investment firms acquire more shares of corporations, 
thereby gaining additional control over the companies in which they invest, 
and as shareholders in general become more activist, it will become 
increasingly important for Delaware law to be easily understood and 
predictable when shareholders and boards of directors consider the 
litigation effects of bylaw amendment conflicts.  Because of the number of 
difficulties presented to shareholders attempting to pass a bylaw 
amendment, these laws themselves have historically been unimportant.  
However, small numbers of investment firms now hold major blocks of 
shares, reducing some of the difficulties in passing a shareholder bylaw 
amendment.  One of the biggest hurdles in passing a shareholder bylaw 
amendment is that many shareholders are rationally apathetic, and often 
give management their proxy with little or no research on the matters up for 
vote.108  A second major problem is that shareholders face a collective 
 
 103. Gordon Smith, Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., THE CONGLOMERATE, June 16, 2006, 
e inability to 
tion.”). 
ay start pressing management 
nt for McConvill’s Psychonomicosis, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41, 45 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/06/bebchuk_v_ca_in.html. 
 104. See Latham and Watkins, M&A Deal Commentary, at 2 (August 1, 2006) 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1620_1.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (“A 
critical issue for activist institutional investors historically has been their relativ
translate successful shareholder proposals into compliant corporate ac
 105. See ASHTON PARTNERS, supra note 71 (quoting Carl Icahn). 
 106. See Reid, supra note 70 (arguing that shareholders m
to incorporate in states with pro-shareholder legal regimes). 
 107. Id. (“[Delaware] always has been most responsive to corporate managment [sic].”). 
 108. Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against Shareholder Participation:  A 
Treatme
(2007). 
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t shareholders will begin to successfully adopt bylaw 
amen
tivists gain a position of decision-making 
authority in the coming years. 
 
 
 
action problem,109 as they are unable to coordinate with each other in 
passing an amendment.  By consolidating the voting power in a small 
number of investment firms, the individual benefit of monitoring the board 
will begin to outweigh the costs, eliminating the rational apathy problem.  
Also, the smaller number of firms involved in the voting process reduces or 
eliminates the collective action problem.  This consolidation of power 
means that shares will start being voted in concert, creating the realistic 
possibility tha
dments. 
Delaware is the legal forum that is consistently chosen by 
corporations, in part due to its high level of predictability.110  Delaware has, 
however, fallen behind other states in adopting laws that govern the bylaw 
amendment battles that can occur between shareholders and a board of 
directors.111  In order to beat back advances of Nevada112 and Wyoming,113 
among other states, in securing incorporations (and the accompanying 
corporate tax dollars), the Delaware legislature needs to address this issue.  
In providing the board of directors with a strong say in bylaw disputes, 
Delaware will perpetuate its history of being management-friendly114 and 
will continue to attract big business.  At the same time, creating laws 
allowing shareholders to pass bylaw amendments of limited duration, will 
put Delaware in a position to maintain the majority of the incorporation 
market should shareholder ac
 109. George W. Dent Jr., Academics in Wonderland:  The Team Production and 
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1253 (2008). 
 110. See, e.g., Delaware Intercorp, Why Incorporate in Delaware? 
http://www.delawareintercorp.com/t-WhyIncorporateinDelaware.aspx (last visited February 
24, 2008) ( “Delaware’s large body of business laws helps a company plan carefully to 
avoid a lawsuit.”). 
 111. See supra Part IV. 
 112. See, e.g., Xtreme Business Solutions, Nevada Corporations Online, http://www. 
nevadacorporationsonline.com/nvvsdel.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (comparing Nevada 
and Delaware corporations and concluding that Nevada is a preferable state to incorporate 
within). 
 113. See, e.g., Corporations Today Inc., COMPARE WYOMING, http://www.corporations 
today.com/compare.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (comparing Wyoming, Nevada, and 
Delaware laws and concluding that Wyoming is the most business friendly of the three). 
 114. See, e.g., 3M Co, Proxy Statement (DEF 14A/Item 4) (March 23, 1995) (“Delaware 
offers corporate governance law friendly to management.  In 1986, for example, the state 
removed the financial penalty for directors who violate the fiduciary duty of care . . . .”). 
